Showing posts with label Wayne County Circuit Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wayne County Circuit Court. Show all posts

Friday, November 30, 2012

Sibling Visitation - Does it Exist?


We have all heard the term “visitation” before, especially if you have been involved in a child custody dispute or divorce.  The term most often used by family law lawyers and professionals is “parenting time”; referring to the legal right [and obligation] of a parent to spend time with one’s child following a divorce.  

Even grandparents, under limited and specific circumstances, may have a legal right to visit with their grandchildren according to Michigan law.

But what about siblings?  Does a brother or sister have the right to visit their sibling, if for some reason they are no longer living within the same household? 

The short answer is that sibling visitation is not recognized as a legal right in Michigan.   The Child Custody Act does not provide for visitation rights between siblings.  Add adoption into the mix and the result remains the same – but for a more specific reason.  

Earlier this month, the Michigan Court of Appeals grappled with, and attempted to decide
this very issue in Wilson v King; a published thus binding opinion of the intermediate appellate court.

Marquita Wilson, the plaintiff-mother in this case, had three children who were eventually adopted into a new family in 2008 after her parental rights had been terminated.  Ms. Wilson then gave birth to a fourth child; Mac.  

The adoptive parents of Ms. Wilson's three children initially allowed Mac to visit with his siblings.  Sadly, for reasons not stated in the Court of Appeals opinion, the adoptive parents ultimately discontinued these sibling visits.  

Ms. Wilson filed suit on behalf of Mac in Wayne County Family Court.  The family court judge dismissed the claim on the basis that the right to “sibling visitation” does not exist under Michigan Law.  On appeal, Ms. Wilson argued that Michigan law does provide for a cause of action for sibling visitation and that the lower court had erred in dismissing her case.  

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision – but did not find one way or the other on whether or not Michigan law provides for a cause of action for sibling visitation.  Instead, the Court focused on the fact that Mac’s older siblings had been adopted.  

Adoption legally severs any ties to the prior, natural family, and creates, in its place, a new adoptive family recognized at law.  This means that, legally speaking, Mac’s older siblings (once they had been adopted) were no longer his legal siblings in the eyes of the law.   

The Court of Appeals held that even if a cause of action regarding sibling visitation existed (which the Court made sure to footnote that they offered “no opinion as to the viability of such a claim”) in Mac’s instance the claim must fail as the three adoptive children were no longer his siblings. 

While we recognize the psychological importance of eliminating contact with biological parents in order to facilitate growth in the new adoptive family, this ruling strikes us as similar in spirit to the old paternity act that denied a biological father standing to seek any parenting time with his child whatsoever.

The ruling seems to foster the notion of wiping-out all traces of the adopted child's  biological family.  Many adopted children, as they mature, seek out traces of their biological families.  Some of these children, as they mature into adulthood, obsess over their lost families and seek therapy to deal with the loss.

At base, however, there is really no-way in cases like this to allow sibling visitation, without also focusing on the biological parents.  Our adoption laws currently do not provide for the maintenance of two families; just one: the adoptive family.





Sunday, April 8, 2012

Shariah Law and Divorce

In an unpublished decision released in the middle of last month, the Michigan Court of Appeals found fault with the Wayne County Family Court in a divorce case that touched on the application of Shariah law.

Specifically, the Hammoud case involved the imposition of spousal support in a realaitively short-term marriage. The Court of Appeals was troubled that the family court conditioned the duration of the "open ended" support on wife obtaining an "Islamic divorce" decree, noting:
As structured by the trial court, plaintiff has no incentive to become self-sufficient or to vigorously pursue an Islamic divorce as she is assured an ongoing income ad infinitum.  The trial court also failed to address or seek further clarification of plaintiff’s contention that she was in possession of a document that would permit others to assist or assure her the attainment of an Islamic divorce without defendant’s consent.  Plaintiff indicated that an agreement existed that would permit her brother and brother-in-law to authorize the Islamic divorce, potentially rendering it within plaintiff’s control to prolong her receipt of spousal support.
The implication, as held by the Court of Appeals, was that the family court pressured the husband into agreeing to an Islamic divorce when, under the establishment clause, it had no power to do so.

The Court of Appeals was not impressed with the lower court, the litigants, or their attorneys.  The case also featured an [untranslated] Arabic language prenuptial agreement proffered by husband to support his position that his wife agreed to forgo any spousal support.

The Hammoud case received national attention with a reference in Law Professor Eugene Volokh's law blog; the Volokh Conspiracy.

We here at the Law Blogger agree that family court is not the place for the implication or enforcement of religious laws; that is for the house of worship and is a private matter between the litigants.



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Sunday, June 5, 2011

Biological Father Cannot Parent His Law School Love Child

They were students at Cooley Law School in the late 1990s.  She was married; he was from Buffalo, New York. 

Their long-term adulterous affair eventually led to the birth of a child in 2002.  Although Mother's husband was on the birth certificates of both her children born during her marriage, she informed her law school lover that he was the biological father of the child born in 2002; subsequent DNA testing confirmed this fact.

When his love child was three years old, and armed with the confirming DNA results, bio-dad sought an order of filiation in a paternity action he filed in New York state.  For her part, Mother challenged the New York family court's jurisdiction, as the paternity suit did not name her husband as a necessary party, and the paternity of her second child was already established by operation of Michigan law.

Not so fast.  The New York family court found that some of the couples' adulterous liaisons took place within the state of New York thus, the child could have been conceived in that state.  Conceding that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Mother or her husband, and acknowledging that paternity of the child had been established in accord with Michigan law, the New York family court nevertheless refused to dismiss bio-dad's paternity action, ultimately granting bio-dad's order of filiation.

Meanwhile, paternity actions were cranked-up back here in the Wayne County family court by Mother's Husband and bio-dad.  All three parties sought summary disposition of the paternity issue.  Bio-dad's petition sought to enforce the order of filiation issued by the New York family court; the family court judge in Wayne County agreed, citing the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.

Mother appealed and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the Wayne County family court, holding that bio-dad lacked standing to sue here in Michigan.  The case hinged on the definition of a child born "out of wedlock".  The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the married couple did not seek a determination that their child was born out of wedlock, bio-dad cannot seek that determination, regardless of his New York order of filiation.

Bio-dad also asserted that the Wayne County family court was required to give his order from New York full force and effect under the United States Constitution.  In the most interesting portion of the published opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected bio-dad's assertion, holding that the comity clause of the constitution does not apply when the issuing court lacks jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the New York court conceded it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Husband, and that the New York family court left enforcement of the order it issued to the courts in Michigan.

Last week, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave for further appeal in an evenly divided 3-3 ruling; Justice Brian Zahra did not participate as he was on the Court of Appeals panel at the intermediate appellate court.

Justice Marilyn Kelly wrote a thoughtful dissent, noting the case presented issues of jurisprudential significance.  She is not conviced that the Court of Appeals properly concluded that the New York order was not entitled to the full faith and credit of the Wayne County family court.  Justice Kelly noted that bio-dad did have proper standing in the New York family court that issued the order of filiation.  Also, she noted that this order was issued and affirmed on appeal in New York prior to any paternity action being filed in Wayne County.

For these reasons, she would have granted leave to appeal so that the issues presented in the case could be resolved.  For now, this question will continue to percolate throughout the family courts of our state.

DNA has long been available to determine paternity.  The Michigan legislature, however, in both the child custody act and the paternity act, has been reluctant to allow such conclusive test results to disrupt an established family.

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