On The Custody of Cryopreserved Embryos

By:  Timothy P. Flynn

Now here's a sticky one.  What does an unmarried couple do with their fertilized and cryopreserved embryos when they break-up?

That was the question of first impression posed to a panel of the Illinois Court of Appeal's Second Division in Jacob Szafranski vs Karla Dunston.  The in vitro fertilization case from Chicago involves the custody of frozen pre-embryos [female ova fertilized by male sperm] following dissolution of the progenitors' relationship.

In the spring of 2010, Ms. Dunston was being treated for cancer via chemotherapy, which jeopardized her fertility.  As a result, Dunston requested that Szafranski, with whom she was in a relationship, donate his sperm from which her ova could be fertilized.  He agreed and the IVF embryos were created and frozen.

Prior to this process, the couple executed the fertility center's standard "Informed Consent for Assisted Reproduction", and obtained [but did not execute] a separate "co-parent agreement" prepared by an attorney.  The former document acknowledged that the law regarding custody of the fertilized eggs is in flux; the latter document provided that Ms. Dunston would be granted custody of the eggs in the event the couple split-up.

Szafranski got cold feet right away and texted a break-up message to Dunston.  Not only were they through as a couple, he sued her for custody of the embryos in the Cook County Circuit Court claiming that he did not wish to be forced into fatherhood.  This draws her ire as well as a three-count counter claim seeking a declaratory judgment for sole custody and control over the embryos pursuant to the [unexecuted] co-parenting agreement contemplated by the parties.

The trial court judge awarded the fertilized eggs to girlfriend.  Boyfriend appealed the decision claiming his rights to privacy are implicated by any use of the embryos under the United States and the Illinois Constitutions.  He asserts that his privacy rights require his consent prior to any use of the embryos.

To reach its decision to reverse the trial court and remand the case for further evidentiary proceedings, the Illinois Court of Appeals first took a tour de force of our nation's common law regarding the three methods used to determine custody of cryopreserved embryos: the contractual approach; contemporaneous mutual consent; and the [always useful] balancing test.  In the end, the appellate court opted for the contractual approach when applicable and the balancing test in the absence of a contract.

Under the contractual approach, a majority of jurisdictions would honor and enforce the terms set forth in an assisted reproduction contract.  The mutual consent approach, on the other hand, provides for the possibility of one of the progenitors changing his or her mind regarding the ultimate use of the cells.  So far, only Iowa has adopted this method of embryo custody determination.

The balancing test approach is a hybrid, considering all the terms of the executed contract, if any, but also weighing the respective interests of the progenitors.

In this case, the appellate court wanted more information about the parties' intent and their agreement surrounding the IVF process that took place.  So the case has been remanded to the trial court for additional proceedings.  A careful read of this opinion has us thinking that the appellate court was looking for the assent of the parties, as expressed in a contract.

Who do you believe should have custody, possession and control over these frozen zygotes?  How do you think the courts in Illinois will ultimately decide this case?

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Grandparents Lack Standing When Parental Rights Are Terminated

By: Amanda Chapman

A recent 2-1 Michigan Court of Appeals decision published earlier this month, Porter v Hill, ruled that when a “natural” parent’s rights to their child are terminated, the grandparents rights are terminated along with the parents.  This ruling seems to conflict with the Child Custody Act.

The heart of this controversial ruling centers on the definition, or lack thereof, of “natural” parent vs “legal” parent.  At least for now, grandparents are out-of-luck, and this ruling will inflict some pain on select families.

In the Porter case, the bio-Mom and Dad were married with two children.  Mr. Porter’s parental rights to the children were involuntarily terminated as a result of physical abuse.  The parties were subsequently divorced.  Mr. Porter passed away, and his parents (the children’s paternal biological grandparents) then filed suit in Saginaw Circuit Court for grandparenting time with their grandchildren. 

Mother filed a motion for summary disposition, attempting to keep her ex-husband’s parents from establishing rights with her children.  Mother’s legal theory was that the grandparents did not have standing, or a legal cause of action under these facts. 

Mother’s dispositive motion asserted that when father’s parental rights were terminated that, in turn, meant that any rights grandparents may have had under the grandparenting provisions of the Child Custody Act had been severed as well.  The trial court reluctantly granted mother’s motion for summary disposition, openly acknowledging this case would be appealed to the Supreme Court. 

   

It is important to note that no determinations have been made, either in the trial court or the appellate court, as to the relative fitness of the Plaintiff-Grandparents, or whether granting grandparenting time would be in the best interests of the children.

A summary disposition motion is a dispositive motion that attempts to dismiss the case before it proceeds through discover and onward to trial.  The only question considered in this instance was whether the grandparents had a legal cause of action (otherwise known as “standing”) to bring the case in the first place.

Michigan’s Child Custody Act includes a section pertaining to grandparenting time which provides that

[a] child’s grandparent may seek a grandparenting time order under 1 or more of the following circumstances:…  (c) The child’s parent who is a child of the grandparents is deceased.

The statute defines “parent” as “the natural or adoptive parent of a child.”  “Grandparent” is defined as “a natural or adoptive parent of the child’s natural or adoptive parent.  

The Court of Appeals affirmed the family court’s decision, holding:

Russell was not a legal parent of the children…  Plaintiffs, as Russell’s parents, derived their rights as grandparents through him. 

The court further stated that

it would be anomalous for the Legislature to authorize a court to terminate a person’s parental rights based on abuse but then to somehow “revive” those rights for purposes of grandparent visitation.

Interestingly, Judge Mark Boonstra authored a dissenting opinion.  First, Judge Boonstra noted that:

[T]he Legislature’s use of the phrase natural parent and its affording to a grandparent of a right to seek grandparenting time independent of parental rights and notwithstanding parental desires…indicate both the plaintiffs …substantial interest in this case and that the statutory scheme at least implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the plaintiffs.

Next, Judge Boonstra pointed out that the statute:

permits a ‘natural parent’ of a ‘natural parent’ to seek grandparenting time…and there is no dispute here that plaintiffs were the ‘natural parents’ of Russell. The only question before us, therefore, is whether Russell was a ‘natural parent’ of the minor children.

The dissent further goes on to elucidate the fact that the Child Custody Act does not provide a definition for natural parent.  The words of a statute provide the most reliable indicator of the Legislature’s intent and should be interpreted on the basis of their ordinary meaning and context in which they are used.   An undefined statutory word must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning…    

In Porter, the grandparents argued that natural parent should be interpreted as equivalent to biological parent.  The dissenting opinion supports this interpretation on the basis of the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “natural” according to the Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991) which defines it as “related by blood rather than by adoption.”  Further, the dissent goes on the use Black’s Law Dictionary (9^th ed) definition of “natural” as “relating to birth” as in a “natural child as distinguished from [an] adopted child.”

The majority opinion based their ruling on equating a natural parent to be the equivalent of a legal parent.   Yet, the dissent astutely pointed out that the basis of such a determination does not coincide with the plain and ordinary meaning of the word term “natural,” and in fact the term is much more in-line as being similar to plaintiffs’ proffered “biological” term.  The dissent contends that “natural parent must connote something more and different than simply having “legal” parental rights.”

Some local family law lawyers have opined that the majority of the Court of Appeals got this one dead wrong.  For now, however, the majority decision stands.

In its decision, the intermediate appellate court asks the Legislature to clarify their intended meaning of the term natural parent; let's not hold our breath.    

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Collaborative Divorce Software

Michelle Crosby of Wevorce

The collaborative divorce method is where a married couple, either by themselves or with the assistance of professionals, agree upon the terms of their divorce judgment prior to filing for divorce.  The theory is that, without the adversarial pressures of the family court and the "system" [i.e. Friend of the Court], these parties are free to explore and negotiate options that make sense for them, not the Court and the lawyers.

Professional assistance usually takes the form of divorce lawyers, counselors, church leaders, and now, specialized collaborative divorce software known as Wevorce.  This West Coast start-up was founded by Michelle Crosby, a product of the old-school divorce process.  Introducing her divorce tool product on the company website, Ms. Crosby tell us that her parents waged a 15-year war over her parenting time.

According to the ABA Journal, the "up-front" cost to purchase the software for a family is about $6500; many individual spouses would spend north of $5000 on divorce lawyers, each, depending on the case.

The idea behind the cloud-based software, not yet available here in Michigan, is to prompt the divorcing couple to "populate" their divorce documents with customized and customizable clauses on the usual divorce issues of child custody, support, parenting time and division of the marital estate, both assets and debts.  The philosophy embedded into the software is taken from the collaborative divorce process: discuss and negotiate prior to a formal divorce filing so that when the official pleadings are filed, it's already a "done deal", presumably with a signed settlement agreement or judgment of divorce.

While the price and the process sure is alluring, it is not for everyone.  Some couples will not be able to put their deep-seated differences aside to accommodate this software any more than they can sit through a series of marital counseling sessions.

It is nice, however, to have a collaborative model available to those couples that do not wish to spend the children's college savings on attorneys.  We shall see whether the Wevorce software ever becomes available here in Michigan.

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Medical Marijuana Parent Not Disqualified for Custody

Like with the use of any other prescription medications, a parent who uses medical marijuana is not disqualified from custody in a family court according to the Michigan Attorney General.  If the pot-medicating  parent, however, exhibits behavior that is unreasonably dangerous to a minor child, the immunity provided by the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act [MMMA] may not be available.

Attorney General Bill Schuette was asked for an advisory opinion by State Senator Rick Jones (R-Grand Ledge) on the issue of whether the MMMA can be invoked by a parent who is the subject of a child protective proceeding, and what constitutes behavior creating an unreasonable danger for a minor child.

In a well-crafted 17-page opinion, the AG zeroed-in on the specific provision of the Act dealing with pot and  children, and noting the exception to that provision.  Section 4(c) of the MMA states:

A person shall not be denied custody or visitation of a minor for acting in accordance with this Act, unless the person's behavior is such that it creates an unreasonable danger to the minor that can be clearly articulated and substantiated.

As for what type of pot-related behavior constitutes the creation of such an unreasonable danger, the Act does not say.  According to the Attorney General, an individual assessment would need to take the specific circumstances of the parent and child into account.  Certainly, things like substance abuse and addiction are legitimate inquiries relative to a juvenile protective or custody proceeding.  The MMA will not provide immunity in a family court from taking such things into account.

AG Schuette opined, "the medical use of marihuana alone does not create an unreasonable danger to a child."   Schuette cautioned in the opinion, however, that if a parent's use of marijuana negatively impacts that parent's ability to properly care for a child, it could be part of the overall custody assessment.

Germane to a custody investigation is whether the parent, while high, is sufficiently functional and thus capable of parenting a minor; the child's age is an important factor; whether, once high, the parent can drive the child to safety if an emergency arises; and does the child have asthma that could be affected by second-hand marijuana smoke.

These are a few of the concerns we conjured up over here at the electronic divorce lawyer.  The best course of action, we think, is not to get high, or  take other mood altering substances, around your children.

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Sex Change Does Not Invalidate Divorce

Of course, this case comes to us from Ann Arbor.  Last month, the Court of Appeals decided a divorce case involving gender reassignment in a published decision.

In the case of In re Estate of Burnett, a couple had been married when Husband underwent gender reassignment surgery and became a woman in 2003.  His Wife, who had apparently supported the M-T-F gender change, subsequently became incapacitated.  Her children obtained a guardianship and conservatorship over their mother due to her dementia and filed for divorce on her behalf.

Doing some forum shopping, Wife's children, as her guardians, first tried to file the divorce proceeding in Pennsylvania but they were rebuffed.  Although the couple was married in Ann Arbor in the mid-1980s, they had lived in Philadelphia until Wife returned to her daughter's home in Washtenaw County back in 2006.

Defendant-Husband argued before the Washtenaw Family Court that his gender reassignment rendered the marriage invalid as between a same-sex couple; Michigan outlawed same-sex marriages in 2004 by an amendment to our constitution.  Husband also tried to get the divorce proceeding thrown-out on the grounds that a fiduciary could not file for divorce on behalf of a ward.

The family court judge denied both motions for summary disposition, ruling that the couple had entered into a valid marriage contract back in the 1980s, not a same-sex marriage contract.  The Court of Appeals upheld the decision, stating:

We likewise reject Defendant's argument that his alleged post-operative status somehow magically dissolves what was otherwise a valid marriage.

Nor did the Court of Appeals see grounds for an annulment of the Burnett marriage.  Simply, Husband, even though now a woman through surgery, is out of luck.

In the meantime, Wife has since passed away so the case now has merely symbolic and precedential value.  Even if the United States Supreme Court were to recognize same-sex marriages this spring as a component to our constitutional rights to privacy and liberty, the result in this case would be the same.  As noted by the Court of Appeals, the unilateral acts of one spouse cannot render a valid marriage invalid.

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QDRO Specialist A Necessity in Divorce Judgments

When a couple divorces with retirement assets, a special order is needed to divide those assets known as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order or QDRO.  Every employer's plan is different and has distinct and specific requirements for the QDRO.

These specifics have given rise to the cottage industry of the QDRO speacialist: a lawyer that is hired at the time of entry of the judgment of divorce for the sole purpose of drafting the QDRO.

Last month, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided Williams v Estate of Williams, a case involving a very old divorce judgment that affected the retirement benefits of a deceased Ford Motor Company employee.  The Wayne County Family Court attempted to go back over a decade into the past to correct what it perceived as a mistake in the division of the employee's pension, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

When the employee, the participant, finally retired after 39-years at Ford, the alternate payee on the plan, i.e. the ex-wife, began receiving her portion of the pension.  The ex-wife was designated as the "surviving spouse" in the QDRO, and began receiving the entire amount of the pension despite the fact she never intended on that result.

The judgment and subsequently entered QDRO awarded 100% of the decedent's pension to his ex-wife after the participant's death. If the QDRO had been drafted in accord with the default judgment, the alternate payee's share should have been the same as it was when the participant first entered into "pay status" upon his retirement.

The case is instructive on several fronts:

• The parties to a divorce should hire a specialist to draft any necessary QDROs; 
• Be sure that the language of the QDRO and the judgment of divorce are consistent; 
• If the plan administrator corresponds to the parties through the specialist, do not ignore this correspondence as it could spell doom years, even decades later; 
• Do not attempt to draft a "do-it-yourself" QDRO; and 
• Be careful not to "incorporate" the QDRO into the judgment itself because this will limit your options to correct the problem years later, which is what happened in the Williams case.

Often, when a divorce proceeding is grinding down toward a settlement, the parties take their focus off the specific language of a QDRO.  This is most often a mistake, as the division of the retirement assets is one of the most important aspects of the divorce.

Take care to follow-through with your attorney to accomplish this task.

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Divorce Judgments & International Child Abduction

Divorce lawyers will be adding additional required language to their judgments of divorce and parenting time provisions dealing with removing minor children to certain countries.

Recent Michigan legislation enacted on January 9, 2013, requires that parenting time provisions, most often found in judgments of divorce when minor children are involved and legal documents required in resolving custody disputes, must contain additional language addressing the prohibition on exercising parenting time in a country that is not in accord with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The legislation, Public Act 600 of 2012, amends the Child Custody Act, MCL 7.22.27a, and requires the inclusion of specific proscriptions or a written consent by both parents, relative to removing the minor children to a country that has not signed the Hague Convention.   

Divorce attorneys must ensure that their judgments and parenting time documents now contain the required language.  The new required language is a simple addition and addresses a very important, and often overlooked, issue when it comes to parenting time taking place in another country.

We here at the Electronic Divorce Attorney recommend clicking on the following link to obtain more specific language about the Hague’sChild Abduction Section.  For information regarding the signatory countries to the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, check out the State Department website.

If you are handling your divorce or custody case without a lawyer, the State Court Administrative Office (SCAO) website has updated Michigan forms (FOC 67 and FOC 89) that include the newly required language. 

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