Like neighboring Iowa, Illinois just passed a same-sex civil union law; the 6th state in the union (plus D.C.) to do so. This law will likely be tested in court, as in other states passing such progressive legislation.
Like the same-sex marriage law floated in California, civil union statutes, once passed, usually have a rocky road. In Maine like in California, for example, the same sex union become law via referendum, only to be subsequently invalidated by a court.
Invariably, there is a political price attached to this legislation. No surprise, given such a polarizing issue that scholars have long-heralded as the next civil rights struggle in the USA.
Recently in Iowa, Lambda Legal sponsored litigation on behalf of gay couples, asserting that denying a marriage license on a same-sex basis violated the liberty and equal protection interests of the state constitution. In April 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled in favor of the same-sex couples; three of these justices were voted-off the court in the election last fall.
A civil union is an intermediate legislative step toward the institutionalization of same-sex marriage. In addition to the 6 states recognizing civil unions, another four states endorse "domestic partnerships", which provide broad rights for same-sex partners, but do not formalize the union. Many gay couples do not avail themselves of such status, rejecting the compromise.
On the other hand, same-sex legislation has been rejected in more than 30 states. Some states, like Michigan, have amended their constitution to expressly limit the scope of marriage to the union of a man and woman.
Same-sex couples have long-sought benefits and rights enjoyed by conventional married couples such as health insurance coverage, tax breaks, even hospital visitation. Like they did in Iowa, gay advocates often have the means to "put their money where their mouth is" in the form of expert lobby campaigns.
In the nearly two decades since the issue was first litigated in Hawaii, the same-sex movement has taken on religious as well as political tones. Nationally, the issue remains far too close to call.
As our common law tapestry continues to evolve, only time will tell whether this issue will achieve civil rights recognition and eventual institutionalization.
info@clarkstonlegal.com
www.clarkstonlegal.com
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
Tuesday, February 1, 2011
New Hampshire Supreme Court Reviews Family Court Decision on Home Schooling
Custody issues are almost always best-decided by parents outside the courthouse. Sometimes, however, a school choice dispute drives post-divorce parents into the courtroom.
In a case percolating through New Hampshire, a family court judge endorsed a parenting plan between feuding parents that featured public school over home-schooling by the mother. The case was argued before the New Hampshire Supreme Court last week with a decision expected soon.
Mother, Brenda Voydatch, claims a constitutional First Amendment right to direct her daughter's education in accord with her deeply-held religious beliefs. Father, on the other hand, petitioned the family court for an order that his daughter attend public school. The family court judge appointed a guardian ad litem for the child who recommended the switch to public school.
Father knows best; for now.
This case has been acquiring headlines while burning through the NH appellate courts. The parents have already tested their respective positions on the school issue in a full-blown custody trial resulting in joint legal custody, with "physical custody" to the child's mother.
Mother attacked the family court's reliance on the so-called expert testimony of the GAL, an admitted non-expert in the comparative pedagogies sought by the parents. Mother paid her lawyers to be troubled by the court's apparently exclusive reliance on his GAL; a sort-of "judge-in-the-field".
For their part, father's lawyers have scoffed at the notion that any constitutional issues are presented in the case at all. Father sees the family court's public school ruling as an example of tough decision-making; family court style. His pleadings also assert that Mother has exhibited an excessive, Christian, religiosity in her curriculum that has impeded their children's socialization; read "secularization".
The dispute is certainly philosophical, if not constitutional. Stay tuned per usual as we await the outcome of the case and report back to you.
http://www.clarkstonlegal.com/
info@clarkstonlegal.com
In a case percolating through New Hampshire, a family court judge endorsed a parenting plan between feuding parents that featured public school over home-schooling by the mother. The case was argued before the New Hampshire Supreme Court last week with a decision expected soon.
Mother, Brenda Voydatch, claims a constitutional First Amendment right to direct her daughter's education in accord with her deeply-held religious beliefs. Father, on the other hand, petitioned the family court for an order that his daughter attend public school. The family court judge appointed a guardian ad litem for the child who recommended the switch to public school.
Father knows best; for now.
This case has been acquiring headlines while burning through the NH appellate courts. The parents have already tested their respective positions on the school issue in a full-blown custody trial resulting in joint legal custody, with "physical custody" to the child's mother.
Mother attacked the family court's reliance on the so-called expert testimony of the GAL, an admitted non-expert in the comparative pedagogies sought by the parents. Mother paid her lawyers to be troubled by the court's apparently exclusive reliance on his GAL; a sort-of "judge-in-the-field".
For their part, father's lawyers have scoffed at the notion that any constitutional issues are presented in the case at all. Father sees the family court's public school ruling as an example of tough decision-making; family court style. His pleadings also assert that Mother has exhibited an excessive, Christian, religiosity in her curriculum that has impeded their children's socialization; read "secularization".
The dispute is certainly philosophical, if not constitutional. Stay tuned per usual as we await the outcome of the case and report back to you.
http://www.clarkstonlegal.com/
info@clarkstonlegal.com
Monday, January 17, 2011
Adultery in the Marital Bed
Always poor judgment, sometimes an adulterous liason makes it into the marital bed. If the cuckholded spouse learns of the at-home trist, the ensuing divorce is very nasty.
This circumstance was recently featured in the NYT. The article is of note in this blog mostly because it quotes a well-known Michigan divorce attorney; Richard Roane of Grand Rapids.
With New York finally following the rest of the states in 2009, all 50-states now have "no fault" divorce laws on the books. Each state is different, however, as to how adultery, if and when proven, is factored into the divorce judgment.
The Michigan Penal Code has long-contained a chapter on adultery, defined as, "the sexual intercourse of 2 persons, either of whom is married to a third person." The scope of the criminal conduct includes divorced but cohabiting persons. The statute requires the cuckolded spouse to swear-in as the complaining witness and has a brief statute of limitation; one year.
This circumstance was recently featured in the NYT. The article is of note in this blog mostly because it quotes a well-known Michigan divorce attorney; Richard Roane of Grand Rapids.
With New York finally following the rest of the states in 2009, all 50-states now have "no fault" divorce laws on the books. Each state is different, however, as to how adultery, if and when proven, is factored into the divorce judgment.
The Michigan Penal Code has long-contained a chapter on adultery, defined as, "the sexual intercourse of 2 persons, either of whom is married to a third person." The scope of the criminal conduct includes divorced but cohabiting persons. The statute requires the cuckolded spouse to swear-in as the complaining witness and has a brief statute of limitation; one year.
The adultery statute merged into the penal code in 1931. The caselaw on this "consensual" crime goes back to 1884, in a case from Berrien County; People v Hendrickson. That case stands for the evidentiary proposition that the testimony of the un-married participant in an adulterous union (the "other woman") can supply the requisite testimony to support a conviction, subject of course, to cross examination.
In the here and now of 2011, Michigan's family courts have adhered to the "no-fault" provisions of the divorce statutes. Adultery is now a matter of private morals, with family court judges free to exercise their discretion regarding the weight to put on allegations of adultery and their attendant consequences in matters of child custody and property division.
State Senator Ron Jelinek has proposed legislation seeking to abolish adultery as a felony. The proposed legislation, however, has not gone anywhere since being referred to the Senate's judiciary committee shortly after its introduction in February 2009.
Occasionally, the adultery statute is cited in civil cases seeking to apply what is known as the "wrongful conduct" rule which blocks a plaintiff's attempt to gain from an adulterous relationship.
Immoral, but all too common, adultery has always posed a serious threat to the traditional family unit. Adultery, however, is a rarely charged felony. Thus, it's persistence within the penal code, particularly the anti-cohabitation provision, bloats the Michigan Compiled Laws with anachronistic provisions. Transgressions are best addressed within the discretion of the family court judges.
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
Michigan Supreme Court Affirms Father's Child Support Obligation Even When Parental Rights Terminated
There has been some buzz among family law practitioners this week concerning the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in the DHS vs Beck case.
Earlier this year, we posted on the Michigan Court of Appeals decision that held a father, whose chronic drugging resulted in the complete neglect of his children and termination of his parental rights, nevertheless remained obligated to pay child support for his two children. The published Court of Appeals decision was just affirmed by the Michigan Supreme Court.
This case arose from the Oakland County Family Court; it was Judge Martha Anderson that initially terminated Mr. Beck's parental rights. Both parents had been abusing drugs so their two children were placed with grandparents. For her part, the mother got straight, and otherwise complied with a DHS parenting plan; she now has the children.
The Supreme Court's Beck decision is remarkable in that it is the first decision to be issued by the Court in the current term. Also, although the decision affirms the holding of the Court of Appeals, it does so on grounds different then those relied on by the intermediate appellate court.
The father in Beck did not appeal the termination of his parental rights; only the family court's ruling that he remained obligated to pay support for his children. On appeal, the father argued that he was denied due process because he was arbitrarily deprived of his property (i.e. his support payments). Like the intermediate appellate court, the Supreme Court was not convinced, ruling that the father failed to articulate how, exactly, his due process rights were implicated.
One of the issues to arise in the Beck case was that the parental termination provisions of the Juvenile Code are silent as to the corresponding "parental responsibilities".
The Court analyzed the rights and duties implicated by a family court's decision to terminate parental rights while continuing to obligate support payments. Michigan common law has long established a minor child's right to support from both parents. The appellate courts also recognized a parent's right to the "companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children."
In affirming the Court of appeals, the Supreme Court not only separated parental "rights" enumerated in the juvenile code, from the duties set out in the Child Custody Act, it also held that parental rights contained in the Custody Act were distinct and thus independent from the duties created by that same Act.
Of note in the dicta of the Court of Appeal's decision was an express acknowledgment of the current "times of difficult financial circumstances." The Beck panel realized that in such difficult economic times, public policy is served by not shifting all support and maintenance obligations onto the custodial parent or, in some cases, the state.
This is the right decision. If getting high is more important to a father than parenting, the rest of us should not have to pick-up the slack for that father and supply public benefits for such a man's children. He should pay as well, even if he can no longer see his children.
Such are the choices we make in life.
info@clarkstonlegal.com
www.clarkstonlegal.com
Earlier this year, we posted on the Michigan Court of Appeals decision that held a father, whose chronic drugging resulted in the complete neglect of his children and termination of his parental rights, nevertheless remained obligated to pay child support for his two children. The published Court of Appeals decision was just affirmed by the Michigan Supreme Court.
This case arose from the Oakland County Family Court; it was Judge Martha Anderson that initially terminated Mr. Beck's parental rights. Both parents had been abusing drugs so their two children were placed with grandparents. For her part, the mother got straight, and otherwise complied with a DHS parenting plan; she now has the children.
The Supreme Court's Beck decision is remarkable in that it is the first decision to be issued by the Court in the current term. Also, although the decision affirms the holding of the Court of Appeals, it does so on grounds different then those relied on by the intermediate appellate court.
The father in Beck did not appeal the termination of his parental rights; only the family court's ruling that he remained obligated to pay support for his children. On appeal, the father argued that he was denied due process because he was arbitrarily deprived of his property (i.e. his support payments). Like the intermediate appellate court, the Supreme Court was not convinced, ruling that the father failed to articulate how, exactly, his due process rights were implicated.
One of the issues to arise in the Beck case was that the parental termination provisions of the Juvenile Code are silent as to the corresponding "parental responsibilities".
The Court analyzed the rights and duties implicated by a family court's decision to terminate parental rights while continuing to obligate support payments. Michigan common law has long established a minor child's right to support from both parents. The appellate courts also recognized a parent's right to the "companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children."
In affirming the Court of appeals, the Supreme Court not only separated parental "rights" enumerated in the juvenile code, from the duties set out in the Child Custody Act, it also held that parental rights contained in the Custody Act were distinct and thus independent from the duties created by that same Act.
Of note in the dicta of the Court of Appeal's decision was an express acknowledgment of the current "times of difficult financial circumstances." The Beck panel realized that in such difficult economic times, public policy is served by not shifting all support and maintenance obligations onto the custodial parent or, in some cases, the state.
This is the right decision. If getting high is more important to a father than parenting, the rest of us should not have to pick-up the slack for that father and supply public benefits for such a man's children. He should pay as well, even if he can no longer see his children.
Such are the choices we make in life.
info@clarkstonlegal.com
www.clarkstonlegal.com
Saturday, December 11, 2010
Child's Aging Held to be Sufficient Change of Circumstance to Justify Parenting-Time Modification
Very recently, the Michigan Court of Appeals published their decision in the parenting time modification case of Shade v Wright. That case, and its effect on our "family law" jurisprudence, is the subject of our fellow Oakland County law blogger, Cameron Goulding, Esq.
Cameron produces the North Oakland Divorce Blog. This post is his original content; thanks Cam.
Altering child visitation time (technically parenting time modification) just became easier in Michigan. Many judges and friend of the court referees believed that in order for a person to obtain more parenting time with their child or to limit the parenting time of the other party, one had to provide proof equal to that which would be required to change custody. I have long argued that this did not make sense because parenting time and custody are two very different things.
There was really no published Michigan Court of Appeals case or Michigan Supreme Court case that dealt directly with this issue directly. There have been unpublished opinions from the Court of Appeals, however, unless a case is published it is not precedent. What this means is that the trial courts and friend of the court referees do not have to follow what the Court of Appeals has said in a case regarding any given issue unless it is a published case. The Michigan Court of Appeals issued a new published decision on December 3, 2010, Shade v Wright, Mich. App Docket No. 296318 (2010) which held that it should be, and now is due to this case, easier to change the parenting time schedule than it is to alter custody.
This case stated that in order to decrease or increase child visitation with a parent there is a more relaxed burden of proof regarding a change of circumstances or proper cause as a threshold issue than there is with custody. The court went further and stated that normal life changes such as those described above are properly considered when deciding this issue.
In the Shade v Wright case cited above, the change that allowed the mother to change the child’s visitation with the father was that their daughter had started high school and her schedule of activities changed. This is exactly the type of change that trial courts specifically can not consider in order to change custody. Many trial courts and friend of the court referees also believed, before this opinion, that this was exactly the type of change of circumstances that they could not consider in order to allow a change to either increase or limit child visitation. Those courts and referees that believed this were wrong and hopefully they will now follow this case when considering these issues because Shade v Wright is binding precedent.
Children do grow older and as they grow older their relationship with each parent will most likely change as they hopefully grow more independent. As much as it may pain a parent, their own child visitation may have to change to allow the child to find his or her own path which may have the child spend more or less time with either parent despite what the court has previously decided or the parent’s previously agreed. One must also consider that as children grow, they are involved in different activities. As their developmental needs change, both parents must be flexible with their parenting time schedule as much as it may pain the parent.
Cameron's email: goulding@camerongoulding.com
Cameron produces the North Oakland Divorce Blog. This post is his original content; thanks Cam.
Altering child visitation time (technically parenting time modification) just became easier in Michigan. Many judges and friend of the court referees believed that in order for a person to obtain more parenting time with their child or to limit the parenting time of the other party, one had to provide proof equal to that which would be required to change custody. I have long argued that this did not make sense because parenting time and custody are two very different things.
There was really no published Michigan Court of Appeals case or Michigan Supreme Court case that dealt directly with this issue directly. There have been unpublished opinions from the Court of Appeals, however, unless a case is published it is not precedent. What this means is that the trial courts and friend of the court referees do not have to follow what the Court of Appeals has said in a case regarding any given issue unless it is a published case. The Michigan Court of Appeals issued a new published decision on December 3, 2010, Shade v Wright, Mich. App Docket No. 296318 (2010) which held that it should be, and now is due to this case, easier to change the parenting time schedule than it is to alter custody.
This case stated that in order to decrease or increase child visitation with a parent there is a more relaxed burden of proof regarding a change of circumstances or proper cause as a threshold issue than there is with custody. The court went further and stated that normal life changes such as those described above are properly considered when deciding this issue.
In the Shade v Wright case cited above, the change that allowed the mother to change the child’s visitation with the father was that their daughter had started high school and her schedule of activities changed. This is exactly the type of change that trial courts specifically can not consider in order to change custody. Many trial courts and friend of the court referees also believed, before this opinion, that this was exactly the type of change of circumstances that they could not consider in order to allow a change to either increase or limit child visitation. Those courts and referees that believed this were wrong and hopefully they will now follow this case when considering these issues because Shade v Wright is binding precedent.
Children do grow older and as they grow older their relationship with each parent will most likely change as they hopefully grow more independent. As much as it may pain a parent, their own child visitation may have to change to allow the child to find his or her own path which may have the child spend more or less time with either parent despite what the court has previously decided or the parent’s previously agreed. One must also consider that as children grow, they are involved in different activities. As their developmental needs change, both parents must be flexible with their parenting time schedule as much as it may pain the parent.
Cameron's email: goulding@camerongoulding.com
Tuesday, December 7, 2010
Bankrolling the Divorce Settlement
We've all heard about lenders that specialize in loaning to personal injury plaintiffs in advance of their settlement. These firms front the money to the plaintiff, at a significant discount from the amount expected to be realized in the ultimate settlement.
This same princple is being applied to divorce judgments. Get your money now and your divorce later.
Mind you, this is not for folks with middle-class marital estates. Rather, this brand new industry is developing on the left and now the right coasts for married couples that have estates north of 2 or 3 million.
For example, Balance Point Divorce Funding of Beverly Hills, CA was started last year by an attorney, Stacey Napp, with funds she obtained from her own divorce.
In New York City, it looks like it's going to be Churchill Divorce Finance; a firm gearing-up for a mid-winter opening with the promise of, "leveling the legal playing field."
Each of these lending firms will specialize in lending money to parties involved in divorce who are expecting to walk away from court with a fair amount of hard cash; millions in fact. Hard to believe here in Michigan, but those folks are out there.
One advantage of such firms is the ability for a "non-earning" spouse to obtain money in order to pay lawyers and forensic accountants to go after hidden assets, or "cooked" books in the family-owned business.
For others, it's simply an opportunity to get the money now in order to fuel that new, post-divorce lifestyle. In many cases, a little money up front goes a long long way.
www.clarkstonlegal.com
info@clarkstonlegal.com
This same princple is being applied to divorce judgments. Get your money now and your divorce later.
Mind you, this is not for folks with middle-class marital estates. Rather, this brand new industry is developing on the left and now the right coasts for married couples that have estates north of 2 or 3 million.
For example, Balance Point Divorce Funding of Beverly Hills, CA was started last year by an attorney, Stacey Napp, with funds she obtained from her own divorce.
In New York City, it looks like it's going to be Churchill Divorce Finance; a firm gearing-up for a mid-winter opening with the promise of, "leveling the legal playing field."
Each of these lending firms will specialize in lending money to parties involved in divorce who are expecting to walk away from court with a fair amount of hard cash; millions in fact. Hard to believe here in Michigan, but those folks are out there.
One advantage of such firms is the ability for a "non-earning" spouse to obtain money in order to pay lawyers and forensic accountants to go after hidden assets, or "cooked" books in the family-owned business.
For others, it's simply an opportunity to get the money now in order to fuel that new, post-divorce lifestyle. In many cases, a little money up front goes a long long way.
www.clarkstonlegal.com
info@clarkstonlegal.com
Wednesday, November 17, 2010
Overreaching, Post-Divorce Style: Michael Douglas' Ex Demonstrates "Greed is Good"
Michael Douglas divorced his ex-wife, Diandra, in California back at the turn of the century. She reportedly received $45 million as well as rights to half Douglas' earnings from the "spinoffs" of his completed movie work.
Demonstrating the chief principle from Douglas' hit movie Wall Street, that "greed is good", Diandra filed suit in Manhattan last summer seeking half the actor's royalties from the reprise of Douglas' character, Gordon Geckko. A Manhattan Supreme Court Judge dismissed the case on procedural grounds, finding that venue was improperly laid.
The judge got it right. Diandra's rights to Douglas' earnings would come from the terms of their divorce decree rather than a separate cause of action filed in another state.
Here at the Law Blogger, we have to wonder why Diandre's attorney advised her to file in Gotham rather than California. The reason stated in the pleadings was that both parties currently reside in New York.
Procedural defects aside, Douglas' lawyer asserted that Diandre was not entitled to any of Douglas' earnings from his new movie to the extent they are derived from a "sequel" to the original movie and thus does not qualify as a "spinoff", as referenced in the divorce judgment.
Sequel vs Spinoff? Sounds like Diandre's lawyers have twice let her down...
info@clarkstonlegal.com
www.clarkstonlegal.com
Demonstrating the chief principle from Douglas' hit movie Wall Street, that "greed is good", Diandra filed suit in Manhattan last summer seeking half the actor's royalties from the reprise of Douglas' character, Gordon Geckko. A Manhattan Supreme Court Judge dismissed the case on procedural grounds, finding that venue was improperly laid.
The judge got it right. Diandra's rights to Douglas' earnings would come from the terms of their divorce decree rather than a separate cause of action filed in another state.
Here at the Law Blogger, we have to wonder why Diandre's attorney advised her to file in Gotham rather than California. The reason stated in the pleadings was that both parties currently reside in New York.
Procedural defects aside, Douglas' lawyer asserted that Diandre was not entitled to any of Douglas' earnings from his new movie to the extent they are derived from a "sequel" to the original movie and thus does not qualify as a "spinoff", as referenced in the divorce judgment.
Sequel vs Spinoff? Sounds like Diandre's lawyers have twice let her down...
info@clarkstonlegal.com
www.clarkstonlegal.com
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